Media Competition and Electoral Politics

A. Piolatto, F. Schuett

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Abstract: We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation, media slant, and selection of politicians. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens derive utility from following a rule that maximises their group's welfare. The rule speci fies whether to vote and consume news. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. We also provide insights about the impact of competition on the most competent candidate's chance of election.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages39
Volume2013-072
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2013-072

Fingerprint

politics
candidacy
market
political participation
politician
voter
news
election
welfare
citizen
ability
evidence
Group

Keywords

  • Demand for news
  • Electoral turnout
  • Group-rule utilitarianism
  • Media bias

Cite this

Piolatto, A., & Schuett, F. (2013). Media Competition and Electoral Politics. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-072). Tilburg: Economics.
Piolatto, A. ; Schuett, F. / Media Competition and Electoral Politics. Tilburg : Economics, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Piolatto, A & Schuett, F 2013 'Media Competition and Electoral Politics' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2013-072, Economics, Tilburg.

Media Competition and Electoral Politics. / Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.

Tilburg : Economics, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-072).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Media Competition and Electoral Politics

AU - Piolatto, A.

AU - Schuett, F.

N1 - Pagination: 39

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Abstract: We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation, media slant, and selection of politicians. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens derive utility from following a rule that maximises their group's welfare. The rule speci fies whether to vote and consume news. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. We also provide insights about the impact of competition on the most competent candidate's chance of election.

AB - Abstract: We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation, media slant, and selection of politicians. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens derive utility from following a rule that maximises their group's welfare. The rule speci fies whether to vote and consume news. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. We also provide insights about the impact of competition on the most competent candidate's chance of election.

KW - Demand for news

KW - Electoral turnout

KW - Group-rule utilitarianism

KW - Media bias

M3 - Discussion paper

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T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Media Competition and Electoral Politics

PB - Economics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Piolatto A, Schuett F. Media Competition and Electoral Politics. Tilburg: Economics. 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).