Media competition and electoral politics

A. Piolatto, F. Schütt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates' ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. While information pushes up independent turnout, partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate, and on average they vote less when informed
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)80-93
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume130
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2015

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Turnout
Media markets
Expected utility
Empirical evidence
News
Vote
Political participation

Keywords

  • Demand for news

Cite this

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Media competition and electoral politics. / Piolatto, A.; Schütt, F.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 130, 10.2015, p. 80-93.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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