Abstract
Despite the aggregate value of M&A market transactions amounting to several trillions dollars on an annual basis, acquiring firms often underperform relative to non-acquiring firms, especially in public takeovers. Although hundreds of academic studies have investigated the deal- and firm-level factors associated with M&A announcement returns, many factors that increase M&A performance in the short run fail to relate to sustained long-run returns. In order to understand value creation in M&As, it is key to identify the firm and deal characteristics that can reliably predict long-run performance.Broadly speaking, long-run underperformance in M&A deals results from poor acquirer governance (reflected by CEO overconfidence and a lack of (institutional) shareholder monitoring) as well as from poor merger execution and integration (as captured by the degree of acquirer-target relatedness in the post-merger integration process). Although many more dimensions affect immediate deal transaction success, their effect on long-run performance is non-existent, or mixed at best.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Oxford Research Encyclopedia (ORE) of Economics and Finance |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Keywords
- Takeovers
- Mergers and Acquisitions
- Long-run performance
- Corporate Governance
- Corporate Control