TY - JOUR
T1 - Metacognitive awareness of difficulty in action selection
T2 - The role of the cingulo-opercular network
AU - Desender, Kobe
AU - Teuchies, Martijn
AU - Gonzalez Garcia, Carlos
AU - De Baene, Wouter
AU - Demanet, Jelle
AU - Brass, Marcel
N1 - Funding Information:
Carlos Gonzalez Garcia, H2020 Marie Sk?odowska-Curie Actions (https://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010665), grant number: 835767. Marcel Bass, Federaal Wetenschapsbeleid (https://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002749), grant number: IUAPVII/33. Kobe Desender, Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (https://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003130), grant number: 12T9717N.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response) reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by reaction times or prime-response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgement of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.
AB - The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response) reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by reaction times or prime-response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgement of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.
KW - ANTERIOR INSULA
KW - CONFLICT
KW - FAILURE
KW - FEEL
KW - INTEROCEPTION
KW - MEDIAL FRONTAL-CORTEX
KW - PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITION
KW - SENSE
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85118948188&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1162/jocn_a_01773
DO - 10.1162/jocn_a_01773
M3 - Article
SN - 0898-929X
VL - 33
SP - 2512
EP - 2522
JO - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
JF - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
IS - 12
ER -