Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

R.L.P. Hendrickx, J.J.J. Thijssen, P.E.M. Borm

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)441-451
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume73
Issue number3
Early online date17 Jun 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Cost Allocation
costs
Costs
Defects
Minimum cost spanning tree problems
Spanning tree
Spillover
Fair allocation
Transferable utility games

Cite this

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Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability. / Hendrickx, R.L.P.; Thijssen, J.J.J.; Borm, P.E.M.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2012, p. 441-451.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

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