Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

R.L.P. Hendrickx; J.J.J. Thijssen; P.E.M. Borm

doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7

Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

R.L.P. Hendrickx, J.J.J. Thijssen, P.E.M. Borm

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	441-451
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	73
Issue number	3
Early online date	17 Jun 2011
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7
Publication status	Published - 2012

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http://www.springerlink.com/content/82725m47081443n2

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title = "Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability",

abstract = "This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player{\textquoteright}s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.",

author = "R.L.P. Hendrickx and J.J.J. Thijssen and P.E.M. Borm",

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AU - Borm, P.E.M.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2002-070 (rt)

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AB - This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

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DO - 10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7

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SN - 0040-5833

VL - 73

SP - 441

EP - 451

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

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Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

Abstract

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