Abstract
This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which
aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition
increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition
increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Volume | 2020-003 |
| Publication status | Published - 13 Jan 2020 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2020-003 |
Keywords
- TU game
- aggregate monotonicity
- coalitional monotonicity
- egalitarian core
- strong egalitarian core
- egalitarian stability