Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

Bas Dietzenbacher

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

9 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which
aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition
increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages16
Volume2020-003
Publication statusPublished - 13 Jan 2020

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2020-003

Fingerprint

Monotonicity
Core allocation
Egalitarianism
Large core
Axioms
Transferable utility games

Keywords

  • TU game
  • aggregate monotonicity
  • coalitional monotonicity
  • egalitarian core
  • strong egalitarian core
  • egalitarian stability

Cite this

Dietzenbacher, B. (2020). Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007). (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2020-003). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Dietzenbacher, Bas. / Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007). Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2020. (CentER Discussion Paper).
@techreport{295f156e91ad4177b61a1dbf6949d4d0,
title = "Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)",
abstract = "This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on whichaggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalitionincreases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).",
keywords = "TU game, aggregate monotonicity, coalitional monotonicity, egalitarian core, strong egalitarian core, egalitarian stability",
author = "Bas Dietzenbacher",
note = "CentER Discussion Paper Volume: 2020-003",
year = "2020",
month = "1",
day = "13",
language = "English",
volume = "2020-003",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",

}

Dietzenbacher, B 2020 'Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2020-003, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007). / Dietzenbacher, Bas.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2020. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2020-003).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

AU - Dietzenbacher, Bas

N1 - CentER Discussion Paper Volume: 2020-003

PY - 2020/1/13

Y1 - 2020/1/13

N2 - This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on whichaggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalitionincreases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).

AB - This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on whichaggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalitionincreases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).

KW - TU game

KW - aggregate monotonicity

KW - coalitional monotonicity

KW - egalitarian core

KW - strong egalitarian core

KW - egalitarian stability

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2020-003

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Dietzenbacher B. Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2020 Jan 13. (CentER Discussion Paper).