Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

Bas Dietzenbacher

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which
aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition
increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages16
Volume2020-003
Publication statusPublished - 13 Jan 2020

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2020-003

Keywords

  • TU game
  • aggregate monotonicity
  • coalitional monotonicity
  • egalitarian core
  • strong egalitarian core
  • egalitarian stability

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this