This chapter examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta–Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well-known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is proved that the interval DR solution of a convex interval game belongs to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the interval DR solution in the sense of Davis–Maschler and of Hart–Mas-Colell are verified. An axiomatic characterization of the interval DR solution on the class of convex interval games with the help of bilateral Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the constrained egalitarianism for two-person interval games is given.
|Title of host publication||Collective Decision Making|
|Subtitle of host publication||Views from Social Choice and Game Theory|
|Editors||A. van Deemen, A. Rusinowska|
|Place of Publication||Heidelberg|
|Number of pages||304|
|Publication status||Published - 2010|
|Name||Theory and Decision Library C|