Naked Exclusion

Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on “naked exclusion”. Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTILEC
Number of pages44
Volume2009-017
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2009-017

Fingerprint

Exclusive dealing
Exclusion
Buyers
Payment
Prediction
Incumbents
Discrimination
Costs

Keywords

  • exclusive dealing
  • entry deterrence
  • foreclosure
  • contracts
  • externalities
  • coordination
  • experiments

Cite this

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Naked Exclusion : Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing. / Boone, J.; Müller, W.; Suetens, S.

Tilburg : TILEC, 2009. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-017).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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