Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

J. Dijkstra, M.A.L.M. van Assen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We propose a game theoretical model of one-shot network public goods formalizing the ‘closure argument’ that cooperation is more frequent in denser groups or networks. Equilibrium analyses show that (i) an ‘inefficiency problem’ exists: players all preferring mutual cooperation need not all cooperate; (ii) in dyads, groups and networks with degree independence, first order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of cooperation preferences or the degree distribution (weakly) increases cooperation, and (iii) the latter result does not hold for networks with degree dependence. Hence the closure argument always holds in networks satisfying degree independence but not in other networks.
Keywords: Network public goods, Asymmetric information, Co-operation, Closure, Degree dependence, Social exchange heuristic
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-582
JournalSocial Networks
Volume35
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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title = "Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree",
abstract = "We propose a game theoretical model of one-shot network public goods formalizing the ‘closure argument’ that cooperation is more frequent in denser groups or networks. Equilibrium analyses show that (i) an ‘inefficiency problem’ exists: players all preferring mutual cooperation need not all cooperate; (ii) in dyads, groups and networks with degree independence, first order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of cooperation preferences or the degree distribution (weakly) increases cooperation, and (iii) the latter result does not hold for networks with degree dependence. Hence the closure argument always holds in networks satisfying degree independence but not in other networks.Keywords: Network public goods, Asymmetric information, Co-operation, Closure, Degree dependence, Social exchange heuristic",
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Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree. / Dijkstra, J.; van Assen, M.A.L.M.

In: Social Networks, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2013, p. 573-582.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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T1 - Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

AU - Dijkstra, J.

AU - van Assen, M.A.L.M.

PY - 2013

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AB - We propose a game theoretical model of one-shot network public goods formalizing the ‘closure argument’ that cooperation is more frequent in denser groups or networks. Equilibrium analyses show that (i) an ‘inefficiency problem’ exists: players all preferring mutual cooperation need not all cooperate; (ii) in dyads, groups and networks with degree independence, first order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of cooperation preferences or the degree distribution (weakly) increases cooperation, and (iii) the latter result does not hold for networks with degree dependence. Hence the closure argument always holds in networks satisfying degree independence but not in other networks.Keywords: Network public goods, Asymmetric information, Co-operation, Closure, Degree dependence, Social exchange heuristic

U2 - 10.1016/j.socnet.2013.08.005

DO - 10.1016/j.socnet.2013.08.005

M3 - Article

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SP - 573

EP - 582

JO - Social Networks

JF - Social Networks

SN - 0378-8733

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