Abstract
No-claim refunds are cost-control instruments which stipulate a payback agreement contingent on one or more claim-free years. We study how such no-claim refunds affect claiming behavior using claims data from a large German health insurer and a policy that increased the refund size for certain plans. We propose a method to decompose the effect on claims into behavioral and non-behavioral components, and show that individuals responded to the refund policy by reducing claims by eight percent on average. The effect persisted for several years; behavioral responses were stronger for clients with more to gain from the policy; and reductions in claims were not restricted to treatments of questionable medical value.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 105061 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 230 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2024 |
Keywords
- Health insurance
- Moral hazard
- No-claim refund