Non-cooperative and cooperative responses to climate catastrophes in the global economy

A north-south perspective

F. van der Ploeg, Aart de Zeeuw

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

The optimal response to a potential productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption. This paper investigates how differences between regions in terms of their vulnerability to climate change and their stage of development affect the cooperative and non-cooperative responses to this aspect of climate change. It is shown that the cooperative response to these stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions. The non-cooperative response leads to a bit more precautionary saving and diverging carbon taxes. We illustrate the various outcomes with a simple stylized North–South model of the global economy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)519-540
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume65
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2016

Fingerprint

pollution tax
global economy
climate
climate change
smoothing
global warming
vulnerability
productivity
catastrophe
Climate
Catastrophe
Global economy
Carbon tax
Climate change

Keywords

  • global warming
  • tipping point
  • precautionary capital
  • growth
  • risk avoidance
  • carbon tax
  • free riding
  • international cooperation
  • asymmetries

Cite this

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title = "Non-cooperative and cooperative responses to climate catastrophes in the global economy: A north-south perspective",
abstract = "The optimal response to a potential productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption. This paper investigates how differences between regions in terms of their vulnerability to climate change and their stage of development affect the cooperative and non-cooperative responses to this aspect of climate change. It is shown that the cooperative response to these stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions. The non-cooperative response leads to a bit more precautionary saving and diverging carbon taxes. We illustrate the various outcomes with a simple stylized North–South model of the global economy.",
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Non-cooperative and cooperative responses to climate catastrophes in the global economy : A north-south perspective. / van der Ploeg, F.; de Zeeuw, Aart.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 65, No. 3, 11.2016, p. 519-540.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - The optimal response to a potential productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption. This paper investigates how differences between regions in terms of their vulnerability to climate change and their stage of development affect the cooperative and non-cooperative responses to this aspect of climate change. It is shown that the cooperative response to these stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions. The non-cooperative response leads to a bit more precautionary saving and diverging carbon taxes. We illustrate the various outcomes with a simple stylized North–South model of the global economy.

KW - global warming

KW - tipping point

KW - precautionary capital

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KW - risk avoidance

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KW - free riding

KW - international cooperation

KW - asymmetries

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