Non-Cooperative Games

E.E.C. van Damme

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

1270 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution
concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the
question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.
We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and
stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria).
Motivated by experiments that show systematic theory violations, behavioral game
theory aims to integrate insights from psychology to get better answers to the
question ‘how do humans play?’. We provide an overview of the observed
regularities and briefly sketch (beginnings of) theories of boundedly rational play.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER
Number of pages29
Volume2014-077
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2014

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2014-077

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Backward induction
  • behavioral economics
  • correlated equilibrium
  • decision
  • experimental economics
  • game
  • game theory
  • incomplete information
  • noncooperative,
  • perfect equilibrium
  • rationality
  • rationalizability
  • sequential equilibrium
  • stable equilibrium

Cite this

van Damme, E. E. C. (2014). Non-Cooperative Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-077). Tilburg: CentER.

Access to Document