Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings*, Arkadi Predtetchinski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1951-1967
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2010


  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • Stationary strategies
  • Markov process


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