Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel

M.P. Montero

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Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two di¤erent protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. Expected payo¤s conditional on a coalition may depend on the protocol: given a coalition of the apex player with a minor player, an egalitarian protocol yields a nearly equal split whereas a proportional protocol leads to a proportional split.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages24
Volume1999-61
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-61

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Keywords

  • noncooperative bargaining
  • apex games
  • kernel
  • random proposers

Cite this

Montero, M. P. (1999). Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-61). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Montero, M.P. / Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Montero, MP 1999 'Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-61, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel. / Montero, M.P.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-61).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Montero MP. Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).