Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

A. Estevez, P.E.M. Borm, G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output


In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalitional merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the NTU-adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherTinbergen Institute
Number of pages24
VolumeTI 2014-030/II
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2014

Publication series

NameTinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
VolumeTI 2014-030/II


  • NTU
  • bankruptcy problem
  • NTU bankruptcy games
  • Coalitional merge convexity
  • Ordinal convexity

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