Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | EBC |
| Number of pages | 46 |
| Volume | 2010-32 |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Publication series
| Name | EBC Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2010-32 |
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Keywords
- Loan Default
- Islamic Loans
- Religion
- Duration Analysis
Cite this
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Of Religion and Redemption : Evidence from Default on Islamic Loans (Replaced by EBC DP 2012-008). / Baele, L.; Farooq, M.; Ongena, S.
Tilburg : EBC, 2010. (EBC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-32).Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output
TY - UNPB
T1 - Of Religion and Redemption
T2 - Evidence from Default on Islamic Loans (Replaced by EBC DP 2012-008)
AU - Baele, L.
AU - Farooq, M.
AU - Ongena, S.
N1 - This is also CentER Discussion Paper 2010-136 Pagination: 46
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We study default rates on conventional and Islamic loans using a comprehensive monthly dataset from Pakistan that follows more than 150,000 loans over the period 2006:04 to 2008:12. We find robust evidence that the hazard rate on Islamic loans is less than half the hazard rate on conventional loans. Across duration models we include a variety of loan contract, borrower, and bank characteristics, where possible combined with time, borrower, bank and/or borrower*bank fixed effects. In big cities Islamic loans default less likely if the share of religious parties increases, suggesting that religious motivation may determine loan default.
AB - We study default rates on conventional and Islamic loans using a comprehensive monthly dataset from Pakistan that follows more than 150,000 loans over the period 2006:04 to 2008:12. We find robust evidence that the hazard rate on Islamic loans is less than half the hazard rate on conventional loans. Across duration models we include a variety of loan contract, borrower, and bank characteristics, where possible combined with time, borrower, bank and/or borrower*bank fixed effects. In big cities Islamic loans default less likely if the share of religious parties increases, suggesting that religious motivation may determine loan default.
KW - Loan Default
KW - Islamic Loans
KW - Religion
KW - Duration Analysis
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 2010-32
T3 - EBC Discussion Paper
BT - Of Religion and Redemption
PB - EBC
CY - Tilburg
ER -