On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game

H. Benchekroun, A. Ray Chaudhuri

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

226 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages14
Volume2009-23
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2009-23

Keywords

  • transboundary pollution
  • technological innovation
  • differential game

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this