On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences

A. Possajennikov

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The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • indirect evolution
  • spite
  • endogenous preferences


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