On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences

A. Possajennikov

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages15
Volume1999-56
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-56

Fingerprint

Evolutionary stability
Substitutability
Indirect evolution
Complementarity
Incomplete information

Keywords

  • indirect evolution
  • spite
  • endogenous preferences

Cite this

Possajennikov, A. (1999). On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-56). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Possajennikov, A. / On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Possajennikov, A 1999 'On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-56, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences. / Possajennikov, A.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-56).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences

AU - Possajennikov, A.

N1 - Pagination: 15

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N2 - The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.

AB - The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.

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KW - endogenous preferences

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Possajennikov A. On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).