On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices

P. Manzini, A. Sadrieh, N.J. Vriend

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium.Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages27
Volume2002-40
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2002-40

Keywords

  • game theory
  • trust

Cite this

Manzini, P., Sadrieh, A., & Vriend, N. J. (2002). On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2002-40). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Manzini, P. ; Sadrieh, A. ; Vriend, N.J. / On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2002. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Manzini, P, Sadrieh, A & Vriend, NJ 2002 'On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2002-40, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices. / Manzini, P.; Sadrieh, A.; Vriend, N.J.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2002. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2002-40).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices

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AU - Sadrieh, A.

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N1 - Subsequently published in Economic Journal, 2009 Pagination: 27

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium.Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

AB - In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium.Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

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KW - trust

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2002-40

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

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Manzini P, Sadrieh A, Vriend NJ. On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2002. (CentER Discussion Paper).