On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

V. Bhaskar

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Abstract

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result to the battle of sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherCentER
Number of pages21
Volume1995-30
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-30

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Mixed strategy
Contests

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • game theory

Cite this

Bhaskar, V. (1995). On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-30). CentER.
Bhaskar, V. / On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. CentER, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Bhaskar, V 1995 'On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-30, CentER.

On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. / Bhaskar, V.

CentER, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-30).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Bhaskar V. On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests. CentER. 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).