On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

Arkadi Predtetchinski; P.J.J. Herings

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

Arkadi Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	243-246
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	111
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023
Publication status	Published - Jun 2011
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bargaining
Nash bargaining solution
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Stationary strategies
Multiplicity of equilibrium
MODEL

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

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title = "On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria",

abstract = "This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits. ",

keywords = "Bargaining, Nash bargaining solution, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Stationary strategies, Multiplicity of equilibrium, MODEL",

author = "Arkadi Predtetchinski and P.J.J. Herings",

year = "2011",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023",

language = "English",

volume = "111",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Predtetchinski, Arkadi

AU - Herings, P.J.J.

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N2 - This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

AB - This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Nash bargaining solution

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

KW - Stationary strategies

KW - Multiplicity of equilibrium

KW - MODEL

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.023

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 111

SP - 243

EP - 246

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria

Abstract

Keywords

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