On the core of cost-revenue games

Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

A. Estévez-Fernández, J.H. Reijnierse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)606-616
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume237
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2014

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Spanning tree
Game
Costs
Coalitions
Revenue
Cost Sharing
Cooperative Game
Profit
Sharing
Profitability
If and only if

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • cost-revenue allocation problem
  • cooperative game
  • core
  • minimum cost spanning tree problem

Cite this

Estévez-Fernández, A. ; Reijnierse, J.H. / On the core of cost-revenue games : Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. In: European Journal of Operational Research. 2014 ; Vol. 237, No. 2. pp. 606-616.
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On the core of cost-revenue games : Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. / Estévez-Fernández, A.; Reijnierse, J.H.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 237, No. 2, 09.2014, p. 606-616.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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