In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear effiency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is infinite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending on the magnitude of the latter, we show that there may exist optimal linear strict taxes, thus allowing the regulator to induce efficiency without subsidizing the mine industry at any date. We illustrate and argue that the exhaustibility constraint the monopolist extractor faces can be exploited by the regulator to relax the standard trade-off between inducing efficiency and raising revenues from the monopoly.
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Number of pages||15|
|Publication status||Published - 2007|
|Name||CentER Discussion Paper|
- Exhaustible resources
- Imperfect competition
- Optimal taxation