On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games

R.J.A.P. Peeters, J.A.M. Potters

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Abstract

The paper studies the structure of the set of correlated equilibria for 2x2-bimatrix games. We find that the extreme points of the (convex) set of correlated equilibria can be determined very easily from the Nash equilibria of the game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages9
Volume1999-45
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-45

Keywords

  • Correlated equilibrium
  • bimatrix game

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    Peeters, R. J. A. P., & Potters, J. A. M. (1999). On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-45). Econometrics.