On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

M.C.W. Janssen, E. Maasland

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages9
Volume1997-106
Publication statusPublished - 1997

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1997-106

Fingerprint

Stackelberg
Asymmetric information
Follower
Disadvantage

Keywords

  • Separating equilibria
  • signalling games
  • Stackelberg competition

Cite this

Janssen, M. C. W., & Maasland, E. (1997). On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1997-106). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Janssen, M.C.W. ; Maasland, E. / On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1997. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Janssen, MCW & Maasland, E 1997 'On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1997-106, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information. / Janssen, M.C.W.; Maasland, E.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1997. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1997-106).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

AU - Janssen, M.C.W.

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N2 - This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

AB - This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

KW - Separating equilibria

KW - signalling games

KW - Stackelberg competition

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1997-106

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

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Janssen MCW, Maasland E. On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1997. (CentER Discussion Paper).