On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

M.C.W. Janssen, E. Maasland

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Abstract

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages9
Volume1997-106
Publication statusPublished - 1997

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1997-106

Keywords

  • Separating equilibria
  • signalling games
  • Stackelberg competition

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