@techreport{cb1945aa057b48d0aad2578349b35870,
title = "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information",
abstract = "This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.",
keywords = "Separating equilibria, signalling games, Stackelberg competition",
author = "M.C.W. Janssen and E. Maasland",
note = "Pagination: 9",
year = "1997",
language = "English",
volume = "1997-106",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}