Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in the Non-cooperative Infinite-planning Horizon LQ Game

J.C. Engwerda

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

1 Citation (Scopus)
284 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Abstract: In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In this note we relax this assumption and provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game under the assumption that the system as a whole is stabilizable.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages12
Volume2012-052
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2012-052

Keywords

  • linear-quadratic differential games
  • open-loop Nash equilibrium
  • solvability conditions
  • Riccati equations

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in the Non-cooperative Infinite-planning Horizon LQ Game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this