@techreport{f69f3ee8a2674e0982b194e340ceecaf,
title = "Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities",
abstract = "We construct optimal auctions when bidders face financial externalities.In a Coasean World, in which the seller cannot prevent a perfect resale market, nor withhold the object, the lowest-price all-pay auction is optimal.In a Myersonean World, in which the seller can both prevent resale after the auction, and fully commit to not selling the object, an optimal two-stage mechanism is derived.In the first stage, bidders are asked to pay an entry fee.In the second stage, bidders play the lowest-price all-pay auction with a reserve price.In both worlds, the expected revenue is increasing in the financial externality, and each bidder's expected utility is independent of the financial externality.",
keywords = "Optimal auctions, financial externalities, lowest-price allpay auction, Coasean World, Myersonean World",
author = "E. Maasland and A.M. Onderstal",
note = "Pagination: 18",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
volume = "2002-21",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}