Optimal conservation programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs

C. Arguedas, D.P. van Soest

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)305-323
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2011


Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal conservation programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this