Optimal enforcement of competition law

E. Motchenkova

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

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Abstract

Despite the recent theoretical developments in the field of antitrust law enforcement, much still needs to be done in order to prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major indiustries. Although penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law violations has not been achieved. This thesis contributes to the solution of the problem of optimal competition law enforcement. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal combination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement, and the optimal structure and design of leniency programs. In the thesis, the main features of current penalty systems are modeled employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization. We stress the importance of the dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement, since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • van Damme, Eric, Promotor
  • Kort, Peter, Promotor
Award date11 Nov 2005
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056681516
Publication statusPublished - 2005

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penalty
law enforcement
antitrust law
deterrence
Law
price fixing
cartel
game theory
EU
offense

Cite this

Motchenkova, E. (2005). Optimal enforcement of competition law. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Motchenkova, E.. / Optimal enforcement of competition law. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2005. 192 p.
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title = "Optimal enforcement of competition law",
abstract = "Despite the recent theoretical developments in the field of antitrust law enforcement, much still needs to be done in order to prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major indiustries. Although penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law violations has not been achieved. This thesis contributes to the solution of the problem of optimal competition law enforcement. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal combination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement, and the optimal structure and design of leniency programs. In the thesis, the main features of current penalty systems are modeled employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization. We stress the importance of the dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement, since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power.",
author = "E. Motchenkova",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
isbn = "9056681516",
series = "CentER Dissertation Series",
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school = "Tilburg University",

}

Motchenkova, E 2005, 'Optimal enforcement of competition law', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Optimal enforcement of competition law. / Motchenkova, E.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2005. 192 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

TY - THES

T1 - Optimal enforcement of competition law

AU - Motchenkova, E.

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Despite the recent theoretical developments in the field of antitrust law enforcement, much still needs to be done in order to prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major indiustries. Although penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law violations has not been achieved. This thesis contributes to the solution of the problem of optimal competition law enforcement. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal combination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement, and the optimal structure and design of leniency programs. In the thesis, the main features of current penalty systems are modeled employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization. We stress the importance of the dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement, since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power.

AB - Despite the recent theoretical developments in the field of antitrust law enforcement, much still needs to be done in order to prevent collusion and price-fixing in the major indiustries. Although penalties were recently increased considerably and new instruments of cartel deterrence such as leniency programs, were introduced, still complete deterrence of antitrust law violations has not been achieved. This thesis contributes to the solution of the problem of optimal competition law enforcement. We approach this problem from the angle of possible refinements of current penalty schemes for violations of competition law. In particular, we determine the optimal combination of instruments such as the amount of the fine and the rate of law enforcement, and the optimal structure and design of leniency programs. In the thesis, the main features of current penalty systems are modeled employing the tools of game theory, dynamic games, and dynamic optimization. We stress the importance of the dynamic analysis of competition law enforcement, since it captures better both the current antitrust rules and the crime process in general. Application of the above-mentioned tools allows us to compare current US and EU penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law and to develop policy implications on how existing penalty schemes can be modified in order to increase their deterrence power.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9056681516

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Motchenkova E. Optimal enforcement of competition law. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2005. 192 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).