Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market

P.M. Kort, G. Feichtinger, R.F. Hartl, J.L. Haunschmied

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In this paper an optimal control model is presented to design enforcement programs minimizing the social costs from both the market and crackdown.By using the maximum principle we show that performing an enforcement policy that leads to a collapse of the drug market is more likely to be optimal when the sales volume depends on the number of dealers.In case of a buyer's market the optimal enforcement policy leads to a saddle point equilibrium where the enforcement rate is fixed such that the number of dealers is kept constant at a positive level.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages22
Volume1996-29
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-29

Fingerprint

Drugs
Enforcement
Dealers
Optimal control
Saddlepoint
Social costs
Maximum principle
Buyers

Keywords

  • optimal control
  • costs
  • microeconomics
  • drug market

Cite this

Kort, P. M., Feichtinger, G., Hartl, R. F., & Haunschmied, J. L. (1996). Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-29). Tilburg: Operations research.
Kort, P.M. ; Feichtinger, G. ; Hartl, R.F. ; Haunschmied, J.L. / Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market. Tilburg : Operations research, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Kort, PM, Feichtinger, G, Hartl, RF & Haunschmied, JL 1996 'Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-29, Operations research, Tilburg.

Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market. / Kort, P.M.; Feichtinger, G.; Hartl, R.F.; Haunschmied, J.L.

Tilburg : Operations research, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-29).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Kort PM, Feichtinger G, Hartl RF, Haunschmied JL. Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market. Tilburg: Operations research. 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).