Optimal Market Design

J. Boone, J.K. Goeree

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with nonlinear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages31
Volume2010-25
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2010-25

Fingerprint

Dynamic markets
Market design
Innovation policy
Innovation
Price-cost margin
Incentive compatible
Competition policy
Mechanism design
Usefulness
Nonlinear pricing
Subsidies
Market regulation
Market equilibrium
Patent system
Joseph Schumpeter

Keywords

  • competition policy
  • dynamic markets
  • competition measures
  • Schumpeter
  • mechanism design

Cite this

Boone, J., & Goeree, J. K. (2010). Optimal Market Design. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-25). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Boone, J. ; Goeree, J.K. / Optimal Market Design. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Boone, J & Goeree, JK 2010 'Optimal Market Design' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2010-25, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Optimal Market Design. / Boone, J.; Goeree, J.K.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-25).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with nonlinear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.

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Boone J, Goeree JK. Optimal Market Design. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper).