Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry

H. Karle, T.J. Klein, K.O. Stahl

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTILEC
Volume2011-013
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2011-013

Fingerprint

Industry
Ownership and control
Investors
Product market
Monopoly
Competitors
Assets
Differentiated products
Profit

Keywords

  • Differentiated products
  • separation of ownership and control
  • private benefits

Cite this

Karle, H., Klein, T. J., & Stahl, K. O. (2011). Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-013). Tilburg: TILEC.
Karle, H. ; Klein, T.J. ; Stahl, K.O. / Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry. Tilburg : TILEC, 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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Karle, H, Klein, TJ & Stahl, KO 2011 'Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-013, TILEC, Tilburg.

Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry. / Karle, H.; Klein, T.J.; Stahl, K.O.

Tilburg : TILEC, 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-013).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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KW - private benefits

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Karle H, Klein TJ, Stahl KO. Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry. Tilburg: TILEC. 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper).