The presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers who control corporate resources in modern companies has led to the emergence of governance mechanisms assuring that financiers' funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects. In a vast majority of European countries, ownership concentration is one of the most important internal mechanisms of corporate governance. While the theoretical literature stipulates that the presence of a large shareholder procures benefits, it also acknowledges the costs it involves. This dissertation investigates the role of shareholder control structures in different corporate governance regimes and tries to assess the resulting costs and benefits. Chapter 1 motivates the thesis. Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of substantial changes in the ownership structures of the Polish listed companies. Chapter 3 investigates the link between shareholder control structures and the governance efficiency of managerial labor market mechanisms in the UK. Chapter 4 examines the patterns in payout policy of UK firms in the 1990s and assesses empirically the validity of clientele theories of payout. Chapter 5 relates payout ratios to control structures for the UK firms.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||12 Nov 2004|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 2004|