Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance

G. Trojanowski

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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Abstract

The presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers who control corporate resources in modern companies has led to the emergence of governance mechanisms assuring that financiers' funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects. In a vast majority of European countries, ownership concentration is one of the most important internal mechanisms of corporate governance. While the theoretical literature stipulates that the presence of a large shareholder procures benefits, it also acknowledges the costs it involves. This dissertation investigates the role of shareholder control structures in different corporate governance regimes and tries to assess the resulting costs and benefits. Chapter 1 motivates the thesis. Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of substantial changes in the ownership structures of the Polish listed companies. Chapter 3 investigates the link between shareholder control structures and the governance efficiency of managerial labor market mechanisms in the UK. Chapter 4 examines the patterns in payout policy of UK firms in the 1990s and assesses empirically the validity of clientele theories of payout. Chapter 5 relates payout ratios to control structures for the UK firms.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Renneboog, Luc, Co-promotor
  • Hege, U., Co-promotor
  • de Roon, Frans, Promotor
Award date12 Nov 2004
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056681362
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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Corporate governance
Ownership structure
Shareholders
Payout
Ownership concentration
Market mechanism
Payout policy
Resources
Governance mechanisms
Governance
Costs and benefits
Managers
Managerial labor markets
Clientele
Corporate control
Large shareholders
Agency conflict
European countries
Listed companies
Costs

Cite this

Trojanowski, G. (2004). Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Trojanowski, G.. / Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 190 p.
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Trojanowski, G 2004, 'Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance. / Trojanowski, G.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 190 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

TY - THES

T1 - Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance

AU - Trojanowski, G.

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

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AB - The presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers who control corporate resources in modern companies has led to the emergence of governance mechanisms assuring that financiers' funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects. In a vast majority of European countries, ownership concentration is one of the most important internal mechanisms of corporate governance. While the theoretical literature stipulates that the presence of a large shareholder procures benefits, it also acknowledges the costs it involves. This dissertation investigates the role of shareholder control structures in different corporate governance regimes and tries to assess the resulting costs and benefits. Chapter 1 motivates the thesis. Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of substantial changes in the ownership structures of the Polish listed companies. Chapter 3 investigates the link between shareholder control structures and the governance efficiency of managerial labor market mechanisms in the UK. Chapter 4 examines the patterns in payout policy of UK firms in the 1990s and assesses empirically the validity of clientele theories of payout. Chapter 5 relates payout ratios to control structures for the UK firms.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9056681362

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

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ER -

Trojanowski G. Ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 190 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).