Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games

Riccardo Ghidoni, Blair Cleave, Sigrid Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-159
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

Fingerprint

Stranger
Contagion
Experiment
Meta-study
Social dilemma

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • contagion
  • matching protocol
  • laboratory experiment
  • meta-study

Cite this

Ghidoni, Riccardo ; Cleave, Blair ; Suetens, Sigrid. / Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games. In: European Economic Review. 2019 ; Vol. 116. pp. 148-159.
@article{22eec278ad95474cb8d2296697df624c,
title = "Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games",
abstract = "This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.",
keywords = "cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study",
author = "Riccardo Ghidoni and Blair Cleave and Sigrid Suetens",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002",
language = "English",
volume = "116",
pages = "148--159",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier Science BV",

}

Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games. / Ghidoni, Riccardo; Cleave, Blair; Suetens, Sigrid.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 116, 07.2019, p. 148-159.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games

AU - Ghidoni, Riccardo

AU - Cleave, Blair

AU - Suetens, Sigrid

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.

AB - This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.

KW - cooperation

KW - contagion

KW - matching protocol

KW - laboratory experiment

KW - meta-study

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

M3 - Article

VL - 116

SP - 148

EP - 159

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

ER -