Perfect and imperfect strangers in dilemma games

Riccardo Ghidoni, Blair Cleave, Sigrid Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-159
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • contagion
  • matching protocol
  • laboratory experiment
  • meta-study

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