Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas

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This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihoodis sufficiently high.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jan 2018

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • cooperation
  • contagion
  • matching protocol
  • laboratory experiment
  • meta-study


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