Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihoodis sufficiently high.
LanguageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages27
Volume2018-002
StatePublished - 11 Jan 2018

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2018-002

Fingerprint

social dilemma
experiment

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • contagion
  • matching protocol
  • laboratory experiment
  • meta-study

Cite this

Ghidoni, R., Cleave, B., & Suetens, S. (2018). Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2018-002). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Ghidoni, Riccardo ; Cleave, Blair ; Suetens, Sigrid. / Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ghidoni, R, Cleave, B & Suetens, S 2018 'Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2018-002, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas. / Ghidoni, Riccardo; Cleave, Blair; Suetens, Sigrid.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2018. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2018-002).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Ghidoni R, Cleave B, Suetens S. Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2018 Jan 11, (CentER Discussion Paper).