Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Riccardo Ghidoni; Blair Cleave; Sigrid Suetens

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Riccardo Ghidoni, Blair Cleave, Sigrid Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

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Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	148-159
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	116
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002
Publication status	Published - Jul 2019

Keywords

cooperation
contagion
matching protocol
laboratory experiment
meta-study

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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

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title = "Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas",

abstract = "This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study",

author = "Riccardo Ghidoni and Blair Cleave and Sigrid Suetens",

year = "2019",

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AU - Cleave, Blair

AU - Suetens, Sigrid

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AB - This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - cooperation

KW - contagion

KW - matching protocol

KW - laboratory experiment

KW - meta-study

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

M3 - Article

VL - 116

SP - 148

EP - 159

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

ER -

Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Abstract

Keywords

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