Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Riccardo Ghidoni, Blair Cleave, Sigrid Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-159
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • contagion
  • matching protocol
  • laboratory experiment
  • meta-study

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