Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz; János Flesch; P.J.J. Herings; Arkadi Predtetchinski

doi:10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz
, János Flesch
, P.J.J. Herings^*
, Arkadi Predtetchinski

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	965-985
Number of pages	21
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	69
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2020
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Infinitely many players
Minority games
Subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria
Upper semicontinuous functions

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10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3

Cite this

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abstract = "We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.",

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AU - Predtetchinski, Arkadi

PY - 2020/6/1

Y1 - 2020/6/1

N2 - We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.

AB - We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.

KW - Infinitely many players

KW - Minority games

KW - Subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria

KW - Upper semicontinuous functions

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ER -

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Abstract

Keywords

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