Perfect information games where each player acts only once (vol 69, pg 965, 2020)

Kutay Cingiz, Janos Flesch, P.J.J. Herings*, Arkadi Predtetchinski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalErratum / corrigendumScientific

Abstract

In the original publication of the article, the last name of the corresponding author was omitted by mistake. The correct name should read: P. Jean-Jacques Herings. The original article has been corrected.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)905-906
Number of pages2
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume70
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2020
Externally publishedYes

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