Political pressure deflection

J.E. Anderson, M. Zanardi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-150
JournalPublic Choice
Volume141
Issue number1-2
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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