Abstract
One of the principle characteristics of additive manufacturing is that customers get access to their own design, i.e., they need not choose from a small number of standard products. The paper considers a framework where an incumbent with a standard technology produces a limited number of standard products, and faces a potential entrant with an additive manufacturing technology. We find that three different outcomes are possible: the incumbent accommodates entry while producing just one product, blockades/deters entry, or it has to leave the market due to too heavy competition from the entrant. We give conditions under which each of these outcomes will occur.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 190-199 |
Journal | International Journal of Production Economics |
Volume | 194 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2017 |
Keywords
- Market entry game
- Entry deterrence
- Entry accommodation
- Hotelling line
- Additive manufacturing