Potential Maximizers and Network Formation

M. Slikker, P.K. Dutta, C.G.A.M. van den Nouweland, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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Abstract

In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games.Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs.The formation process is modelled as a game in strategic form, where the payoffs are determined according to a weighted (extended) Myerson value.This class of solution concepts turns out to be the unique class resulting in weighted potential games.The argmax set of the weighted potential predicts the formation of the complete structure and structures payoff-equivalent to the complete structure.As by-products we obtain a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the weighted (extended) Myerson values.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages19
Volume758
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameFEW Research Memorandum
Volume758

Fingerprint

Potential Games
TU Game
Shapley Value
Solution Concepts
Cooperative Game
Representation Theorem
Hypergraph
Game
Predict
Class
Form

Keywords

  • game theory

Cite this

Slikker, M., Dutta, P. K., van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M., & Tijs, S. H. (1998). Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. (FEW Research Memorandum; Vol. 758). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Slikker, M. ; Dutta, P.K. ; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. ; Tijs, S.H. / Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. 19 p. (FEW Research Memorandum).
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Slikker, M, Dutta, PK, van den Nouweland, CGAM & Tijs, SH 1998, Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. FEW Research Memorandum, vol. 758, vol. 758, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. / Slikker, M.; Dutta, P.K.; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. 19 p. (FEW Research Memorandum; Vol. 758).

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

TY - BOOK

T1 - Potential Maximizers and Network Formation

AU - Slikker, M.

AU - Dutta, P.K.

AU - van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.

AU - Tijs, S.H.

N1 - Pagination: 19

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games.Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs.The formation process is modelled as a game in strategic form, where the payoffs are determined according to a weighted (extended) Myerson value.This class of solution concepts turns out to be the unique class resulting in weighted potential games.The argmax set of the weighted potential predicts the formation of the complete structure and structures payoff-equivalent to the complete structure.As by-products we obtain a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the weighted (extended) Myerson values.

AB - In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games.Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs.The formation process is modelled as a game in strategic form, where the payoffs are determined according to a weighted (extended) Myerson value.This class of solution concepts turns out to be the unique class resulting in weighted potential games.The argmax set of the weighted potential predicts the formation of the complete structure and structures payoff-equivalent to the complete structure.As by-products we obtain a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the weighted (extended) Myerson values.

KW - game theory

M3 - Report

VL - 758

T3 - FEW Research Memorandum

BT - Potential Maximizers and Network Formation

PB - Microeconomics

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Slikker M, Dutta PK, van den Nouweland CGAM, Tijs SH. Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. Tilburg: Microeconomics, 1998. 19 p. (FEW Research Memorandum).