Presumption of dishonesty: Epistemic injustice towards asylum seekers

Assessing the credibility of asylum seekers’ testimonies is central to immigration officers’ decisions regarding their claims for refuge. This asylum procedure is fraught with epistemic injustices beyond the basic role of truth assessment to determine what counts as valid asylum claims. This paper identifies a specific type of epistemic injustice, so-called the presumption of dishonesty, which is encountered by asylum seekers. We develop our concept by examining the credibility assessment of gay and lesbian asylum seekers in the Netherlands, where such individuals undergo a specific credibility assessment. The presumption of dishonesty, we argue, stems from the prejudice that labels asylum seekers ‘bogus’ claimants -– ‘needy’ individuals who allegedly fabricate asylum claims for personal gain. This specific form of testimonial injustice entails that hearers attribute compromised credibility to speakers, assessing their testimonies against an ‘ideal’ or ‘truthful answer’. For gay and lesbian asylum seekers, this entails providing testimony about their journey of self-acceptance, awareness, and experiencing negative emotions such as shame and guilt, based on Western stereotypes of gender and sexual orientation. Focusing specifically on the position of these asylum claimants as ‘needy’ individuals, helps to understand why testimonies may still be dismissed, even when asylum seekers’ testimonies align with the stereotypical standards of evaluation held by the hearers. We contend that this is a testimonial injustice that is aimed at those who are perceived as the ‘needy’. Consequently, the hearer’s suspicion persists despite the presentation of trustworthy testimony, making it practically impossible to navigate the insurmountable standards of evaluation imposed.