Abstract
Abstract: We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50% probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We find that even when messages are not delivered trustees who make a promise are significantly more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. This suggests that a promise has a commitment value which is independent of its impact on the trustor. Interestingly, we also find that both trustees who make a promise and those who do not make a promise are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the trustor. This means that communication increases trustworthiness irrespective of the content of messages.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |
Publisher | Economics |
Number of pages | 30 |
Volume | 2012-064 |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Publication series
Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2012-064 |
Keywords
- Promises
- communication
- trust
- beliefs
- experimental economics
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Promises as commitments [Dataset]
Ismayilov, H. (Creator), Potters, J. (Creator) & University, T. (Contributor), DataverseNL, 8 Nov 2013
DOI: 10.34894/o60lwp, https://dataverse.nl/citation?persistentId=doi:10.34894/O60LWP
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