Public Congestion Network Situations, and Related Games

J. Kleppe, J.H. Reijnierse

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Abstract

This paper analyzes congestion effects on network situations from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. In network situations players have to connect themselves to a source. Since we consider publicly available networks any group of players is allowed to use the entire network to establish their connection. We deal with the problem of finding an optimal network, the main focus of this paper is however to discuss the arising cost allocation problem. For this we introduce two different transferable utility cost games. For concave cost functions we use the direct cost game, where coalition costs are based on what a coalition can do in absence of other players. This paper however mainly discusses network situations with convex cost functions, which are analyzed by the use of the marginal cost game. In this game the cost of a coalition is defined as the additional cost it induces when it joins the complementary group of players. We prove that this game is concave. Furthermore, we define a cost allocation by means of three egalitarian principles, and show that this allocation is an element of the core of the marginal cost game. These results are extended to a class of continuous network situations and associated games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages15
Volume2007-58
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2007-58

Keywords

  • Congestion
  • network situations
  • cooperative games
  • public

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