Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

C.N. Noussair, D.P. van Soest, J.T.R. Stoop

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)537-559
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number3
Early online date2 Sept 2014
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2015


  • effort level
  • negative externality
  • social dilemma
  • baseline treatment
  • cooperation level


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