### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 249-266 |

Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |

Volume | 36 |

Issue number | 2 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 2011 |

### Fingerprint

### Cite this

}

*Social Choice and Welfare*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 249-266. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0474-5

**Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules.** / Quant, M.; Borm, P.E.M.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules

AU - Quant, M.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2005-20 (rt)

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - This article introduces and analyzes random conjugates of bankruptcy rules. A random conjugate is a rule which is derived from the definition of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems. For example, the random conjugate of the Aumann–Maschler rule yields an extension of concede-and-divide: the basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants. Using the concept of random conjugates an alternative characterization of the proportional rule is provided. It turns out that the procedural definition of a random conjugate extends several of the properties of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems to the general domain of problems with an arbitrary number of claimants.

AB - This article introduces and analyzes random conjugates of bankruptcy rules. A random conjugate is a rule which is derived from the definition of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems. For example, the random conjugate of the Aumann–Maschler rule yields an extension of concede-and-divide: the basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants. Using the concept of random conjugates an alternative characterization of the proportional rule is provided. It turns out that the procedural definition of a random conjugate extends several of the properties of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems to the general domain of problems with an arbitrary number of claimants.

U2 - 10.1007/s00355-010-0474-5

DO - 10.1007/s00355-010-0474-5

M3 - Article

VL - 36

SP - 249

EP - 266

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 2

ER -