Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities

Peter Borm, Y. Ju, D. Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by constructing an implementation mechanism. This mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree of freedom to form coalitions. The same framework of bidding and renegotiation allows for natural variations of the RBS-mechanism. In this way, alternative “Shapley-like” values are obtained, and a unified platform to analyze and compare these solutions is provided.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)236-254
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume157
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2015

Keywords

  • externalities
  • bargaining
  • partition function form game
  • rational belief Shapley value
  • implementation
  • bidding mechanism

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