Regulate or Deregulate: Influencing Network Interconnenction Charges

B. van de Wielle

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    Abstract

    We study the choice between regulating interconnection charges or delegating their determination to the operators, both in a non-mature and a mature market. Three regulatory regimes are considered: full, cost-based and bill-and-keep. Delegation corresponds to bargaining about the interconnection charges using the regulatory schemes as disagreement outcomes.Applying regulation benefits the consumers.Under full regulation, access charges account for asymmetries and allow a unique Ramsey price.Delegation benefits the operators.In a mature market delegation robs the government of any market influence.In a non-mature market government preferences coincide with those of the largest operator and are disadvantageous for entry.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherVakgroep CentER
    Number of pages38
    Volume2003-68
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2003-68

    Keywords

    • regulations
    • delegation
    • telecommunication industry

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  • Cite this

    van de Wielle, B. (2003). Regulate or Deregulate: Influencing Network Interconnenction Charges. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-68). Vakgroep CentER.