Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions

Soesja Grundel, Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In a resource allocation problem, there is a common-pool resource, which has to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual concave reward function on assigned resources, thus generalizing the model of Grundel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 78(2):149–169, 2013) with linear reward functions. An assignment of resources is optimal if the total joint reward is maximized. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment, based on bilateral transfers of resources only. Analyzing the associated allocation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that the core and the nucleolus of a resource allocation game are equal to the core and the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)37-54
JournalTop
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2019

Fingerprint

Reward
Resource Allocation
Resource allocation
Nucleolus
Resources
Game
Assignment
Bankruptcy
Optimality
Necessary Conditions
Sufficient Conditions
Model

Keywords

  • resource allocation games
  • concave reward function
  • core
  • nucleolus

Cite this

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Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions. / Grundel, Soesja; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert.

In: Top , Vol. 27, No. 1, 04.2019, p. 37-54.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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