Restrictions in spatial competition

The effects on firms and consumers

Berno Büchel, Jan Klein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Despite the rich stream of research that evolved from Hotelling's spatial competition model, the fact that firms’ strategies are constrained by their technological capabilities, the legal environment, or overriding corporate strategies is commonly neglected. We study a model of Hotelling–Downs competition in which two firms choose a position along a one-dimensional market given that their feasible positions are restricted to an interval. Strategy restrictions turn out to substantially affect firms’ behavior and consumers’ surplus. In contrast to existing results on spatial competition, we find that in equilibrium firms may minimally differentiate away from the center of the market or even locate completely independently of consumers’ preferences. Assessing social welfare by total transportation costs, we observe that restrictions may both enhance and reduce welfare, depending on whether the feasible positions overlap.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)157-172
JournalHomo Oeconomicus
Volume33
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2016
Externally publishedYes

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Spatial competition
Legal environment
Transportation costs
Firm behavior
Hotelling
Technological capability
Firm strategy
Consumer preferences
Corporate strategy
Social welfare
Consumer surplus

Keywords

  • Product differentiation
  • Hotelling–Downs
  • Median voter

Cite this

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Restrictions in spatial competition : The effects on firms and consumers. / Büchel, Berno ; Klein, Jan.

In: Homo Oeconomicus, Vol. 33, No. 1-2, 08.2016, p. 157-172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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